The State of Missouri sought a per se rule that the natural dissipation of BAC always constitutes an exigency. (Many states, including Minnesota, have held this.) The Court rejected that argument, because BAC declines in a gradual and predictable fashion such that a particularized case-by-case inquiry is necessary in each case. The inquiry is thus whether the police can reasonably procure a warrant before the evidence, well, self-destructs. Because the State didn't bother to argue here that there were exigent circumstances in this case (it just wanted the per se rule), the Court affirmed the conviction.
Okay, so far this case isn't terribly remarkable-- but what I found striking about McNeely is that unlike most Fourth Amendment cases we've studied, here technology advances actually help criminal defendants. In other contexts, new technology has enhanced the police's ability to investigate and charge people with crimes: Katz (wiretapping); Smith (pen register); Kyllo (thermal sensors); Jones (long-term GPS surveillance). The defendants won in many of those cases, but one of the central conflicts common to each was this encroachment of technology on privacy without magisterial review for probable cause. (And this is to be expected, as the Fourth Amendment is about state action--technology use benefiting defendants wouldn't really figure into this analysis.)In this case, the majority takes special note of "technological developments that enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so without undermining the neutral magistrate judge’s essential role as a check on police discretion." What sorts of technological developments? The majority points to a 1977 rule change allowing magistrates to issue warrants telephonically, and discusses states where police and prosecutors can apply for search warrants via email and video conferencing. In a separate opinion Chief Justice Roberts notes two particularly innovative jurisdictions:
Utah has an e-warrant procedure where a police officer enters information into a system, the system notifies a prosecutor, and upon approval the officer forwards the information to a magistrate, who can electronically return a warrant to the officer. Judges have been known to issue warrants in as little as five minutes. And in one county in Kansas, police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads; judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes.
(citations omitted).
Before yesterday, in a per se exigency rule state like Minnesota, law enforcement could take the blood of DUI suspects without consent or a warrant. Now, if there is a true exigency, law enforcement can still do this. This includes delays in the warrant process. But evolving technology like these e-warrant procedures and iPad requests has moved many situations out of the "exigency" box, thus necessitating a warrant. This is not to say all suspects will get off scot-free, but at least a magistrate will give their situation due consideration. And that is better for defendants than the cops being able to say, "Oh there's no possible time to talk to a magistrate, I get to take your blood right now."
(By the way, it also helps that there haven't been competing technological advances in the body's ability to more quickly eliminate alcohol from the system.)
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